| 2PN CELL DONATION AND THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE EMBRYO PROTECTION ACT

| The German legal regulation on embryo donation
Section 1 of the EPA from 1990 refers to the 'improper use of reproduction technology'. 4 Improper within the meaning of criminal law are particularly egg donation, embryo donation and surrogacy. Thereby, the general aim of Section 1 is to prevent a so-called 'divided motherhood', i.e., when the mother genetically related to the child and the mother giving birth to the child are not identical. The underlying assumption of the legislator is that such a family constellation would complicate the self-discovery of the child and thus endanger his or her (emotional) well-being. 5 Therefore, with respect to embryo donation, the EPA not only refers to conducting an embryo donation but already to intending to conduct an embryo donation by punishing 'attempts to fertilise artificially an egg cell for any purpose other than bringing about a pregnancy of the woman from whom the egg cell originated' Göttingen: V&R Unipress). I will therefore distinguish between the two terms. This article refers to the translation of the EPA provided by the Robert Koch Institute.
Retrieved from : https ://www.rki.de/Share dDocs/ Geset zeste xte/Embry onens chutz gesetz_engli sch.pdf?__blob=publi catio nFile [Accessed 30 Nov, 2018] . 5 Cf. German Bundestag, printed paper 11/5460, 25.10.1989, 6-7. 6 Cf. the decision of the prosecution Munich, 124 Js 202366/13, 28 July 2014. ; now it will concern the definition of the terms 'fertilization' and 'egg cell' within Sect. 1 Para 1 No. 2 EPA.
| The inconsistency on the normative status of 2PN cells
The identified legal loophole with respect to 2PN cell donation is based on two inconsistencies within the EPA: first, that the prohibition of (an intended) donation does not apply to 2PN cells; and second, that the rescue clause does not apply to 2PN cells. Both regulations should also apply to 2PN cells.
As mentioned above, the general aim of Section 1 within the EPA is to prevent a 'divided motherhood'. However, the feared danger of such a family constellation is the same for 2PN cell donation as for egg donation, embryo donation or surrogacy. Therefore, on the basis of its own logic, the Act should also prohibit the (intended) donation of 2PN cells.
The second inconsistency, related to the rescue clause, exists on two 18 Official translation slightly changed to express the meaning more accurately. 'Anyone who disposes of, or hands over or acquires or uses for a purpose not serving its preservation, a human embryo produced outside the body, or removed from a woman before the completion of implantation in the uterus, will be punished with imprisonment up to three years or a fine.' Emphasis by the author.
levels: the descriptive and the normative level -which coincide in the EPA. The rescue clause should also apply to 2PN cells because they are, indeed, human embryos within the meaning of the Act (descriptive level) and thereby should be protected by the Act in the same way as embryos (normative level). As the name indicates, the EPA protects embryos.
Within the meaning of the Act 'an embryo already means the human egg cell, fertilised and capable of developing, from the time of fusion of the nuclei, and further, each totipotent cell removed from an embryo that is assumed to be able to divide and to develop into an individual under the appropriate conditions for that' (Sect. 8 Para 1 EPA; emphasis by the author).
The last section refers to the capacity of an entity to develop into a (born) human being (totipotency), which is the decisive criterion within German legal regulation for being referred to, and simultaneously protected as, a human embryo. However, this capacity also already applies to pronuclear stages between impregnation and fusion of the nuclei; in other words, 2PN cells are totipotent. 30 After the penetration of the sperm cell into the egg cell, the fertilization process and further dividing and developing proceed automatically and continuously, given the appropriate conditions. At the time the Act was drafted, the legislator was aware of this fact. According to the justification of the Act, for example, Sect. 
| HOW THE G ERMAN EMB RYO PROTEC TI ON ( AC T ) UNDERMINE S ITS ELF
The implicit assumption that human embryos (from the time of fusion of the nuclei) are endowed with human dignity and the right to life owing to their developmental potential (totipotency), which underlies, inter alia, the rescue clause of the EPA, is based on the ethical potentiality argument (PA). According to the PA, human embryos fall under the purview of human dignity and the protection of life as they potentially possess those intrinsic properties decisive for attributing such a protection status owing to their capacity to develop into born human beings (that actually possess those intrinsic properties). 37 Thereby, the PA classically aims at justifying a protection status for human embryos from the time of fusion of the nuclei that is as strong as that for born human beings. If the PA (as well as the EPA) is, consequently, continued and it can thus be assumed that already 2PN cells should be endowed with human dignity and the right to life owing to their developmental potential, a new form of a classic objection to the PA is being formed: the absurd extension argument. This form of argument belongs to the reductio ad absurdum as a logical method to expose the fallacy within an argument by following its implications to an absurd conclusion. The proponents of the argument are left with the choice of either accepting the (in fact absurd) conclusion as a consequence or 30 Cf., e.g., also Baranzke, H. (2014 35 That the EPA determines the criterion of totipotency as well as a specific time (fusion of the nuclei) in Sect. 8 Para 1 for the legal designation and protection of a human embryo is contradictory, given the fact that there are totipotent entities before this specific time (i.e. 2PN cells) -a fact that was also known by the legislator at that time.
However, the unity of the legal system commands that the legal provision as a whole should be consistent (Section 1 recital 24, German Criminal Code).
36
Cf., e.g., Baranzke, op. cit. note 30, p. 186. 37 It is often assumed that there are two different readings of the PA, which refer either rejecting their argument (at least in this version) and finding a way to improve it that avoids the absurd conclusion. As a counter argument to the PA, the absurd extension argument was raised in two versions by referring to different kinds of entities that had the same developmental capacity as claimed for human embryos and that should therefore be protected in the same way (i.e. as born human beings).
| The earlier version of the absurd extension argument
The argued that, to be attributed with an active potential, it would be necessary for the entity to already be an organism, i.e., a human being with an individual genome, 42 an implicit normative preliminary decision has been taken on the beginning of human life, which is set at the time of fusion of the nuclei. However, this reasoning is circular because it justifies the attribution of human dignity and the right to life, i.e., here the beginning of human life, with an active potential to develop into a (born) human being, and the attribution of such an active potential again with the beginning of human life. 43 Second, the objection indeed distinguishes (separated) gametes from human embryos:
egg and sperm cells (for the sake of the argument, outside a petri dish) do in fact require an additional act to develop into a human being, but so do human embryos in vitro. Gametes already carry the potential to develop into a human being in themselves. Certainly, the developmental potential of egg and sperm cells still needs to be 'switched on' by an additional act (i.e. bringing them together). However, it is not clear why the transfer of human embryos in vitro into the uterus of a woman should be considered as 'merely' providing necessary environmental conditions while, in contrast, the bringing together of egg and sperm cells should be a normatively relevant additional act. 
| The newer version of the absurd extension argument
The technological advances in the field of stem cell research entailed a newer version of the absurd extension argument, which refers to hESC or hiPSC and ultimately to every human somatic cell. 45 An application of tetraploid complementation assay in humans would (theoretically) result in born human beings. Therefore, also already hESC or hiPSC should be endowed with human dignity and protection of life.
Consequently, considering the iPSC reprogramming, the same applies to every human somatic cell. Tetraploid complementation assay is a cloning technique that was first successfully conducted in mammals using iPSC in 2009 and is applied as a pluripotency test for human and non-human stem cells. 46 The procedure merges two cells of a (mouse) 38 Cf., e.g., Merkel, R. (2002 Besides, in my opinion, the question of the beginning of human life is not even a relevant question when analysing the normative status of human embryos, as the formulation of this question already implies a normative relevance of being human.
However, this assumption itself is an argument (i.e. the species argument) for the attribution of a normative status and has to be analysed as such. embryo to one cell with a double diploid set of chromosomes. The resulting tetraploid cell complex itself is restrictedly developable and can only form the trophoblast (outer layer of an embryo in the blastocyst stage from which the placenta and umbilical cord emerge). When this tetraploid cell complex is complemented by ESC or iPSC, these stem cells form the embryoblast (inner cell mass of the embryo in the blastocyst stage, from which the embryo and fetus emerge). After being transferred into the uterus of a mouse, the blastocyst develops in vivo into a viable mouse that is genetically identical to the used stem cells. Because the developing embryo and resulting mouse emerge from the ESC or iPSC, the procedure is considered the most stringent test for pluripotency and a reliable proof of the capacity of these stem cells to differentiate into all cell types and functional organs in the body (pluripotency). 47 However, from the fact that, furthermore, a viable mouse emerges, it can be concluded that ESC or iPSC have the capacity to develop into a (born) being and not only to differentiate into all cell types of the body (totipotency). Therefore, also supposedly pluripotent hESC or hiPSC have to be considered totipotent.
Consequently, owing to this considered valuable capacity, the PA has to protect hESC or hiPSC in the same way as it protects born human beings. Under consideration of the fact that hiPSC are reprogrammed from human somatic cells, this conclusion also applies to every human somatic cell. That version of the absurd extension argument has meanwhile become the major counter argument to the PA. There are three main objections to that version: (1) the objection of a fallacy, (2) the objection of an active potential and (3) the objection of a natural development.
(1) The first objection, which I call 'objection of a fallacy', underlines that the conclusion of the absurd extension argument was wrong. ESC or iPSC are not really totipotent, as they cannot form the trophoblast, which is actually formed by the tetraploid cell complex. Thus, the blastocyst would be totipotent but the used ESC or iPSC only pluripotent. 48 In response to that objection, it has been argued that research has shown how, unlike (2) The second objection of an active potential has already been analysed above with respect to the earlier version of the absurd extension argument. The conclusion for hESC or hiPSC and human somatic cells is the same as for gametes: human somatic cells also carry all the genetic information necessary for the development into a human being in themselves. Certainly, they require additional acts to realize their potential (i.e., the reprogramming of human somatic cells and the complementation of hESC or hiPSC) but so do human embryos in vitro.
Therefore, if requiring an additional act is normatively relevant, then,
consequently, an active potential should only be attributed to human embryos in vivo and fetuses after the necessary transfer of embryos in vitro into the uterus of a woman. Otherwise, it is normatively irrelevant.
(3) The third objection states that human embryos would develop naturally into a human being whereas this development would need to be induced artificially with regard to hESC or hiPSC and human somatic cells. 52 Apart from the fact that it would still have to be argued why the naturalness of a development should be normatively relevant, human embryos in vitro do not develop naturally . They are produced, cultured and transferred artificially. Therefore, to claim that the development had to be natural for the potential to be worthy of protecting within PA excludes not only hESC or hiPSC and human somatic cells but also the actual object of protection (i.e. embryos in vitro) of the PA. 
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